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Introduction
This briefing paper presents and foreshadows ongoing PhD research by the first author into 
how understandings of organised crime in Australia have been shaped, and the extent to 
which these perceptions have influenced legislative and policing responses. It begins with 
an historical survey of significant models of organised crime, then reviews current Australian 
legislative strategies, and goes on to raise questions about the conceptual model that 
underpins these strategies. The paper concludes with a discussion of the potential policy 
implications of this research.
Constructing “Organised Crime”
Early theorists of organised crime (Cressey, 1969; Albini, 1971; Ianni, 1972) examined the 
phenomenon through an ethnic lens focusing on hierarchical structure and power relations 
within criminal “organisations”, “syndicates” and “families.” Theorists then shifted to a 
focus on form of business “enterprise” (Smith, 1980; Haller, 1992), and the “illicit market” 
(Reuter, 1985). The concept of “transnational organised crime” and the organised crime/
terrorism nexus (Makarenko, 2004) extended the perceived “threat” organised crime poses 
to contemporary society. Theorists then applied network models to examine organised 
crime as “criminal networks” (Morselli, 2008). Moreover, when contemplating the organised 
crime literature in hindsight, as a body of (in)coherent thought, scholars have called for the 
integration of theories into an all encompassing meta-model (von Lampe, 2003; Spapens, 
2010). 
The following section traces many of the major conceptions of organised crime from the 
earliest focus on hierarchical structures, to the most recent, being networked enterprises.
Hierarchies, Syndicates and Families
Cressey (1969) depicted organised crime as a hierarchically structured Italian bureaucracy 
with rigid division of labor and role allocation. Cressey’s language (e.g. “theft of the nation”, 
“nullify” state sovereignty, roles according to military positions) and emphasis on ethnicity 
point to links between organised crime and national security that correspond to a time at 
which the United States of America faced a similar “threat” of “theft of the nation” by alien 
communist powers. 
Albini’s (1971) model describes criminal “syndicates” structured according to power relations 
between patrons and clients. “Syndicated crime” involves fluid relationships structured 
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according to the power relations that are 
relevant to the activity that participants 
are involved in at any point in time. Albini’s 
model foreshadows current models that 
emphasise flexible forms of organising.
Ianni’s (1972) patrimonial model of “family 
business” structured organised crime as 
a patriarchal hierarchy, in which respect 
equaled power, and family and business were 
intertwined. Blood or significant relations 
(for example, godparent-child relationships) 
bonded business. Ianni’s model coincided 
with the release of The Godfather film 
(released in 1972) based on the Mario Puzo 
novel (1969) of the same title.
Illicit Enterprise and Markets
Smith (1980) articulated a model of “illicit 
enterprise,” arguing that enterprise occurs 
on a spectrum of legality. Organised crime 
is distinguished only from conventional 
enterprise by the illicit task environment 
in which it occurs. Smith assumes that 
enterprise behavior is the same, regardless of 
where the line of legality is drawn from time 
to time.  Later Haller (1992) extended Smith’s 
ideas, by focusing on the entrepreneurial 
partnership rather than bureaucracies. In 
contrast to Smith’s argument that illicit and 
licit enterprise operate in fundamentally the 
same way, Haller argues illicit enterprise is 
markedly less bureaucratic and centralised 
than enterprise within the legitimate sphere.
Reuter was the pioneer of the market 
approach to studying “illicit markets,” 
forging a cross-disciplinary link with 
economics. His earliest works scrutinised 
the notion of monopoly over illicit markets 
while tentatively exploring the fragmented 
and competitive nature of the illicit market 
(Reuter & Rubinstein, 1978). Later Reuter 
(1983) applied theories of industrial 
organisation and economics (i.e. supply 
and demand) to examine the consequences 
of product illegality: a competitive and 
fragmented illicit market, described by 
Reuter as “disorganised crime.” His model 
was consistent with an increasing focus on 
neoliberal markets based on neoclassical 
economic principles at that time. 
Transnational Criminal Networks
There has been a reshaping of the 
“threat” that organised crime poses 
at a transnational level, afforded by 
new opportunities of globalisation. 
“Transnational organised crime” is seen as 
representing a significant threat because it 
escapes the reach of any sovereign state, 
with profits sometimes feeding into terrorist 
“organisations”/“networks” (Makarenko, 
2004). Once again, links to national, and now 
international security are evident. 
Finally, organised crime has been examined 
as networks (Morselli, 2008). This 
perspective is founded on the notion that all 
individuals (including those who participate 
in organised crime) are embedded in a social 
network of relationships and interactions 
(McIllwain, 1999). Morselli, a prominent 
author in the application of social network 
theory to organised crime, argues that 
organised crime emerges from bottom-up 
interactions. Against the background of an 
ever more interconnected and networked 
information age, the network perspective 
has been applied to organised crime with a 
focus on flexible and spontaneous forms of 
organisation. This contemporary bottom-
up model stands in direct opposition to the 
earliest models of rigid top-down command.
Looking back at these changing conceptions 
of organised crime, it might be argued that 
organised crime is simply a construct (von 
Lampe, 2003).  Various ways of thinking about 
organised crime reflect their disparate social-
historical contexts and have been influenced 
by the political-intellectual climate of the 
time. This historical-conceptual assessment 
invites contemplation about whether the 
intrinsic properties of organised crime have 
changed over time or whether it is the lens 
through which organised crime has been 
viewed that has altered the perceived reality 
of the phenomenon. (See Table 1, Page 3).
Current Australian Legislative 
Climate
Australia’s nine jurisdictions employ different 
combinations of legislative strategies to deal 
with organised crime. In varying measures 
they grant specific law enforcement 
powers for overt and covert investigations, 
confiscation of assets and witness protection. 
Each jurisdiction also addresses, and 
sometimes goes beyond, standards set by 
international law for addressing the organised 
nature of group crime at a transnational level. 
As a party to the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime 
(UNTOC), Australia is required to criminalise 
participation in organised crime groups. 
Scherrer (2009) highlights the difficulties 
of tracing the development and etiology 
of international norms and standards 
that lead to international policy, a point 
also made by Nadelmann (1990) in his 
examination of the complex processes 
of advancing global prohibition regimes. 
Nevertheless, Nadelmann (1990) notes 
that international prohibition regimes (for 
example the prohibition of international 
drug trafficking) tend to reflect the interests 
and moral values of the dominant members 
in international society (in particular the 
United States and Europe). While Australia 
has indeed adopted international norms in 
criminalising participation in organised crime 
groups, several Australian jurisdictions have 
also moved beyond the obligations of the 
UNTOC, demonstrating the importance of a 
context specific examination of the Australian 
legislative climate.
For offenses having a federal aspect, 
criminalisation of participation in an 
organised criminal group (as required by the 
UNTOC) was realised in amendments to the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) passed in 2010. 
At state level, participation prohibitions 
have existed in New South Wales since 
2006 (Crimes Act 1900, amended in 2012) 
and the Australian Capital Territory since 
2010 (Criminal Code 2002). Both grants of 
police powers and participation offences 
are aimed at individuals.  It is not possible, 
as it is in the U.S. under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO), to collectively prosecute whole 
criminal groups as “enterprises” (Ayling 
2011a), demonstrating a key difference in 
organised crime policy between the U.S. and 
Australia. Under RICO there has been large-
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scale disruption of organised crime groups. 
In contrast, Australian participation offences 
so far have had little use.
Recent legislation in some Australian states 
has attempted to deal with the problem of 
outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs), currently 
perceived as Australia’s primary organised 
crime problem, as criminal groups rather 
than collections of criminal individuals. In 
2008 the state of South Australia passed 
the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) 
Act. The main thrust of these laws was 
to empower state authorities to impose 
controls over interactions between and with 
members of criminal organisations using a 
combination of civil instruments (declarations 
and control orders) and criminal penalties 
for non-compliance (thereby exceeding the 
obligations of the UNTOC). This scheme was 
based on the Commonwealth’s terrorism 
laws in its reliance on membership of a 
declared organization (rather than criminal 
convictions or proven involvement in crime) 
to provide a pretext for state action (Ayling 
2011b). Spurred by several public acts of 
violence between OMCGs (particularly the 
Sydney airport murder of Anthony Zervas) 
and the ‘moral panic’ that followed (Morgan 
et al., 2010), the South Australian legislative 
model subsequently cascaded through 
several other Australian jurisdictions: New 
South Wales (Crimes (Criminal Organisations 
Control) Act 2009), the Northern Territory 
(Serious Crime Control Act 2009) and 
Queensland (Criminal Organisation Act 
2009). 
In the midst of this surge of legislation, the 
Standing Committee of Attorneys-General 
(SCAG) resolved in April 2009 that: “…
organised crime is a national issue requiring 
a nationally coordinated response by all 
jurisdictions” (SCAG 2009). SCAG suggested 
the introduction of specific measures by 
Period Model Key Author(s) Key Attributes
1960s-1970s Organised Crime Donald Cressey •	 Focus on ethnicity
•	 Strategic monopoly
•	 Hierarchy and division of labour
Syndicated Crime Joseph Albini •	 Patrons and clients
•	 Stratification of power
•	 Decentralized syndicates
Family Business Francis Ianni (with 
Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni)
•	 Focus on ethnicity and kinship
•	 Roles according to generational status
•	 Patriarchal hierarchy
1980s-1990s Illicit Enterprise Dwight Smith •	 Spectrum of enterprise behaviours
•	 Licit and illicit enterprise is the same
•	 Illicit task environment
Entrepreneurial Part-
nership
Mark Haller •	 Overlapping partnerships
•	 Power over enterprise activity
•	 Enterprise activity determines structure
Illicit Market Peter Reuter •	 Economics of illicit market
•	 Fluid, competitive, supply and demand
•	 Illicit market is disorganised
2000s-
Present
Criminal Networks Carlo Morselli (most 
prominent)
•	 Social system of interactions
•	 Bottom-up interactions generate self-organisation of the network
•	 Fluid, flexible, spontaneous 
Transnational Organ-
ised Crime
UNCTOC •	 Global economy 
•	 Occurs in more than one sovereign state
•	 International security
TABLE 1. Conceptual models of “organised crime”
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States and Territories, including consorting 
and/or anti-association offences. However, 
some other states and territories (Tasmania, 
the ACT and Victoria) decided not to follow 
South Australia’s example. While agreeing to 
SCAG’s recommendations, Western Australia 
adopted a ‘wait and see’ attitude. 
The primary aim in enacting anti-association 
laws was crime prevention. It was thought 
that control orders would thwart members 
in their planning and conduct of criminal 
activities, thereby fragmenting the groups 
and deterring recruits. As well as prohibiting 
communications between members of 
organised crime groups, the orders could also 
prohibit controlled members from entering 
or being near certain premises, applying 
for or undertaking certain occupations or 
possessing specified items (such as firearms). 
Criticism of the laws quickly followed their 
introduction. Concern was expressed that 
many of the evidential and procedural 
innovations in the legislation were 
inconsistent with accepted principles and 
practices of criminal justice. Another criticism 
concerned the role that the laws gave to 
“criminal intelligence” in providing a basis 
for declaration and control order decisions, 
especially given that the intelligence could 
not be disclosed, even to defendants. 
Commentators suggested this would have 
a dire effect on the ability of defendants to 
contest the case against them. Arguments 
that the laws allowed for abuse of civil 
liberties such as freedom of association and 
for the criminalisation of innocent people 
also figured prominently in critical analyses.
Legal challenges to the South Australia and 
NSW laws by OMCG members successfully 
halted their implementation. The High Court’s 
decisions in South Australia v Totani [2010] 
HCA 39 and Wainohu v New South Wales 
[2011] HCA 24 both invalidated provisions of 
those laws on constitutional grounds.
Since then, both states have redrafted their 
respective laws, effectively reinstating the 
earlier legislative model with modifications 
to overcome the deficiencies identified 
by the High Court (Crimes (Criminal 
Organisations Control) Act 2012 (NSW); 
Serious and Organised Crime (Control) 
(Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2012 (SA)). 
Each state has also taken the opportunity to 
strengthen their law as it applies to OMCGs, 
introducing new offences and giving police 
new powers.  In New South Wales these 
changes include new consorting offences 
(Crimes Amendment (Consorting and 
Organised Crime) Act 2012), which have 
already been employed against high-ranking 
Nomads bikies, and new offences relating 
to drive-by shootings. In South Australia the 
parliament has passed legislation to further 
restrict the availability of certain weapons 
and of firearms and other permits (Summary 
Offences (Weapons) Amendment Act 2012; 
Statutes Amendment (Criminal Intelligence) 
Act 2012).
 
The Western Australian parliament, too, is 
currently debating anti-association laws 
(Criminal Organisation Control Bill 2011), 
and Victoria, under a new government since 
the 2009 SCAG meeting, aims to introduce 
OMCG-targeted legislation into parliament 
this year. Moreover, the Northern Territory 
has preemptively revised its legislation to 
take account of the High Court decisions 
(the Serious Crime Control Amendment Act 
2011). A ‘nationally consistent approach’ 
to organised crime is also being considered 
by the Standing Council on Law and Justice 
(previously SCAG) (SCLJ 2012), but it is as 
yet unclear whether this would involve new 
national laws or harmonisation of existing 
laws. 
page4 page5
Policy Implications And Future 
Research Directions 
Anti-association measures have been 
designed to prevent criminal conspiracies 
among OMCG members. However, research 
emerging from Canada suggests that the 
criminal activities of members and their 
associates may operate largely independently 
from the formal structure of the organisations 
that are targeted by this legislation (Morselli, 
2009). This suggests that the legislation may 
be less than fully effective (Ayling 2011b). Why 
then have Australian jurisdictions favoured 
these legislative strategies over others (for 
example, RICO style legislation)? There is as 
yet an absence of evidence that any of these 
legislative measures in fact reduce organised 
crime. Despite this, and the vocal critiques 
of and successful constitutional challenges 
to the laws, Australian jurisdictions have 
demonstrated and continue to demonstrate 
high-levels of commitment to the anti-
association and organisational participation 
legislative strategies. 
It seems that the earliest scholarly models 
of organised crime, such as Cressey’s (1969) 
model with its focus on structure and hierarchy, 
may still have significant influence on how 
organised crime is conceptualised in Australia. 
The current anti-association approach 
simultaneously spotlights some forms of 
organising (overt and semi-permanent groups 
whose members commit criminal acts) while 
shadowing others (more fluid, opportunistic 
and temporary criminal collectivities). 
Similarly, in relation to the amendments 
that introduced participation provisions into 
Commonwealth legislation, Broadhurst and 
Ayling (2009) have commented that:
“This continuing use of the language of 
organisations [in the legislation] suggests 
a focus on criminal groups with clear 
boundaries, defined membership and 
exclusively criminal objectives, despite the 
fact that these forms of organising now seem 
to be the exception rather than the rule…”
The concept of organised crime that is 
accepted at any one time limits and confines 
the “appropriate” legislative response. 
Therefore, there is a need to interrogate the 
conceptual model underpinning the legislative 
measures in force in Australian jurisdictions. 
It is this conceptual model that directs the 
aims and impacts of any intervention. If the 
model is inaccurate, the laws and the law-
enforcement strategies that derive from it 
may be misdirected, ineffective, unnecessary 
or even positively harmful.
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